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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2). 
Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review 
Issue #1: Whether the Court of Appeals should reverse the Order of Dismissal 
pursuant to Appellants' Motion to Reverse Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach 
Individually as Authorized by the Bankruptcy Court (the "Motion to Reverse"), dated 
September 30, 2014, which was based on the Stipulation for Reversal of Order of Dismissal 
as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually between Appellants and Philip G. Jones, Chapter 
7 Trustee of the Estate of Mark Lee Rindlesbach (the "Stipulation to Reverse"). 
Standard of Review and Preservation: Not applicable. This is an issue that was 
first presented to the Court of Appeals by the Motion to Reverse (and which could not have 
been presented to the trial court). The Comi, in its Order dated October 28, 20 I 4, denied 
the Motion to Reverse but also stated that "a ruling on the issues raised in the motion and 
on appeal is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal." 
Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Mark Lee 
Rindlesbach had no personal liability under the Guaranty that he executed as Trustee of the 
Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan. 
Standard of Review: De novo. In an appeal from a summary judgment, the court 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, and gives no deference to the decision of the trial court. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48 iJ 3, 89 P.3d 97. Whether a party is entitled 
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to summary judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Mitchell 
v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 8, 31 P.3d 572. 
Preservation for Appeal: The issue was preserved in the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Mark L. Rindlesbach 's Motion for Summa,y Judgment filed May 10, 2011 
(R. 2333-2342). 
Determinative or Relevant Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1010(1) 
Except as otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally liable on a 
contract properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity in the course of 
administering the trust if the trustee in the contract disclosed the fiduciary capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-103(2) 
Terms not specifically defined in this section have the meanings provided in Section 
75-1-201. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55) 
"Trust" includes a health savings account, as defined in Section 223, Internal 
Revenue Code, any express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever 
and however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or 
decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The 
tenn excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting ttusts, conservatorships, 
personal representatives, trust accounts as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate 
Transfers, custodial arrangements pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, 
business busts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common trust funds, 
voting ttusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Services Licensing 
Act, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying 
debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any 
kind, and any airnngement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-106 
The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except 
to the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state. 
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Statement of the Case 
This is an action brought by Appellants (generally referred to herein as the "Hardy 
Lenders") to enforce a loan guaranty (the "Guaranty") executed by Mark L. Rindlesbach 
("Rindlesbach") as Trustee of the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the 
"Plan") on May 22, 2007. With leave of the court, the Hardy Lenders amended their 
Complaint to add Rindlesbach individually as a defendant. Rindlesbach moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that he had no personal liability because he had signed 
the Guaranty only in his fiduciary capacity. His motion was granted, and an Order of 
Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually was entered on December 4, 2012. 
Statement of Facts and Description of Proceedings 
1. In May 2007, the Hardy Lenders made a $3,300,000 loan to Eagle Mountain 
Lots, LLC (the "Loan"), to facilitate the purchase of 160 acres of land in Eagle Mountain, 
Utah. R. 1058-1065 (~,I 1, 4, 8 and 16). 
2. Rindlesbach, as Trustee of the Plan, along with eight other guarantors, 
guaranteed the Loan. R. 1108-1111. 
3. The Hardy Lenders moved to amend their Complaint in October 2009 to add 
Rindlesbach individually as a defendant. R. 908-917 
4. The Plan opposed on the ground of futility (arguing that Rindlesbach could 
not be personally liable on the Plan's Guaranty). R. 977-982. 
5. The trial court (Judge Denise Lindberg presiding) granted leave to amend. 
ruling that "Plaintiffs have appropriately pied the elements of a breach of contract claim 
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against Mr. Rindlesbach, alleging that he was a guarantor of a loan that is now in default." 
R. 1049, 1052. 
6. When the Second Amended Complaint was served on Rindlesbach, he 
moved to dismiss, arguing (as the Plan had previously contended) that the pleading did not 
state a claim against him personally upon which relief could be granted. R. 1227-1236, 
1237-1240. 
7. Judge Lindberg denied the motion, ruling that under Utah's common law, 
Rindlesbach could be held personally liable on the Guaranty. R. 1346-1350. 
8. After the case had been reassigned to Judge Deno Himonas, Rindlesbach 
moved for summary judgment on the same grounds as the two prior motions described 
above. R. 1955-1984. 
9. His motion was granted in a Memorandum Decision dated February 6, 2012. 
R. 4269-4276. 
I 0. The Hardy Lenders' claim against the Plan was tried to a jury in August 2012. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $5,317,800. R. 7275. 
Judgment was entered against the Plan on December 3, 2012, in the amount of 
$6,367,206.64. R. 8106-8109. 
11. An Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually ("Order of 
Dismissal") was entered on December 4, 2012. R. 8115-8117. 
12. Within days after the jury's verdict (and months before judgment was 
entered), Rindlesbach as Trustee of the Plan and a related Pension Plan that had been 
collapsed into and merged with the Profit Sharing Plan transferred most of the assets out 
4 
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of the Plan to evade enforcement of the Judgment. Rindlesbach quickly sold the transfeITed 
assets and personally pocketed nearly $2.2 million in proceeds from the sale of those assets. 
Motion to Reverse Order of Dismissal filed in this appellate case on September 30, 2014, 
at ,r 12. 
13. The Hardy Lenders pursued litigation to set aside those transfers as 
fraudulent in both Salt Lake and Tooele Counties. Id. at ,r 13. 
14. In the Salt Lake County action Judge John Paul Kennedy held Rindlesbach 
in contempt of court for disobeying orders precluding him from concealing or transfen-ing 
the $2.2 million. Id. 
15. Two weeks later Rindlesbach filed a Voluntary Petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankmptcy Court for the District 
of Utah on September 13, 2013, commencing a case designated as No. 13-30552 (the 
''Bankruptcy Case"). Id. 
16. Philip G. Jones (the "Trustee") was appointed Chapter 11 Trustee in the 
Bankruptcy Case on December 10, 2013. Id. at ,r 14. 
17. Upon conversion of the Bankmptcy Case to a case under Chapter 7, the 
Trustee was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee. Id. at ,r 15. 
18. The Trustee entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement 
Agreement") with the Hardy Lenders, on May 21, 2014, which provided, among other 
things, for the settlement of the Hardy Lenders' claims against Rindlesbach, including 
resolution of this appeal. Id. at ,r 16. 
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19. Upon notice to all pa1iies in interest the Bankruptcy Court granted the 
Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy 
Parties. On July 22, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court entered a final Order Granting Trustee's 
Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy Parties 
and (2) Settlement Between the Trustee and the Lexon Parties (the "Settlement Order"). 
A copy of the Settlement Order is attached hereto as Addendum 1. A copy of the Settlement 
Agreement is attached to that Order. Id. 
20. The Bankruptcy Court's Settlement Order authorized the Trustee to 
"[s]tipulate to the entry of a consent order in the Utah Court of Appeals reversing or 
vacating summary judgment in favor of the Debtor and remanding the case to the district 
court." Settlement Order 114.B. 
21. Sh01ily prior to the filing of this action and during its pend ency, Rindlesbach 
transferred approximate} y 2 7 parcels of real property worth several million dollars out of 
his ownership ( or in a few cases out of an entity that he controlled and partially owned) to 
his wife, Brenda Rindlesbach. One of the significant aspects of the Settlement Agreement 
was the lifting of the automatic stay to allow the Hardy Lenders to pursue fraudulent 
transfer claims against Brenda Rindlesbach. See Settlement Agreement ,r 13.C. 
22. The Settlement Agreement and the Settlement Order approving it further 
provided for the allowance of the claims of the Hardy Lenders in the aggregate amount of 
$4 million, of which approximately $2.6 million was an agreed settlement amount to 





such claim "shall constitute a binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the Hardy 
[Lenders]." Motion to Reverse filed in this appeal on September 30, 2014. 
23. This Court has ordered that the Trustee be substituted for Rindlesbach in this 
appeal. Order dated September 29, 2014. 
24. The Plan is a trust created to provide retirement benefits to employees. R. 
7177 (Stipulated Trial Exhibits 15-18); R. 1751-53, iJ 1. 
Summary of Arguments 
Parties to a litigation matter, including an appeal, ought to be free to settle and 
resolve their disputes consensually and should be encouraged to do so. When they stipulate 
that an appeal be resolved by an order vacating or reversing the lower court's decision, the 
appellate court should as a general proposition grant such relief. The Hardy Lenders agreed 
upon a consensual disposition of this appeal as part of a settlement involving numerous 
other matters by stipulating with the Bankruptcy Trustee that the Order of Dismissal be 
reversed or vacated. Persuasive policy reasons favor reversal of a lower cou11's decision 
when the parties to an appeal therefrom agree to that means of resolving their dispute. Here, 
such a reversal serves the beneficial purpose of aligning the outcome of this case with the 
settlement reached in Rindlesbach's bankruptcy case and approved by the Bankruptcy 
Com1. Such alignment promotes justice in simplifying the avoidance of alleged fraudulent 
transfers and minimizing litigation stemming from a conflict between the trial courf s 
ruling and the Settlement Order entered by the Bankruptcy Com1. 
ff the Court chooses to decide this appeal on the merits, it should reverse the Order 
of Dismissal because it is contrary to Utah's common law of trusts. Under the common 
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law, a trustee is personally liable on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity. 
Although the Utah Legislature has twice modified that liability with respect to some trusts, 
it preserved the common law liability as to all other types by narrowly defining the tenn 
"trust" and by specifying that the common law continues to apply to the extent is has not 
been modified by statute. As an employee benefit trust, Rindlesbach' s Profit Sharing Plan 
falls outside the statutory definition of a trust, both as originally defined in the Uniform 
Probate Code and as later redefined in the Utah Trust Code. Application of the common 
law rule would impose personal liability on Rindlesbach. Thus, the Order of Dismissal was 
erroneous. 
Argument 
I. The Court Should Reverse the Order of Dismissal Pursuant to Appellants' 
Motion to Reverse Based on the Trustee's Stipulation. 
Inasmuch as the Court deferred a final ruling on the issues raised in the Motion to 
Reverse "pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal," the Hardy Lenders 
submit the following argument and authorities to assist the Court in deciding the Motion 
to Reverse. 
The Chapter 7 Trustee is vested with the right and power, independent of the debtor 
in a bankruptcy case, to enter into settlement agreements resolving litigation by or against 
the debtor, subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. E.g., Bauer v. Commerce 
Union Bank, Clarksville, Tennessee, 859 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1988) (Chapter 7 trustee "is 
empowered to compromise causes of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate"); Bailey 
v. Connolly, 361 Fed.Appx. 942 (10th Cir. 2010 (not selected for publication) ("The 
bankruptcy court vested broad authority in the Chapter 11 trustee, the appellee here 
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(Trustee), over the bankruptcy estate's Vanuatu assets, including the power to ... settle the 
appeal of a Vanuatu lawsuit that had resulted in a multi-million-dollar judgment."). By 
means of the Bankruptcy Court's Settlement Order, the Tmstee was authorized to consent 
to an order of this Court reversing or vacating the summary judgment entered in favor of 
Rindlesbach in the trial court. The parties have so stipulated, as stated in the Stipulation for 
Reversal of Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually, filed with the 
Cami on September 30, 2014. 
The Bankruptcy Cami's Settlement Order (if 7) provided for the allowance of the 
Hardy Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach's bankruptcy estate in the reduced amount of 
$4 million, thereby resolving a substantial controversy as to the validity and amount of that 
claim. Further, the Settlement Order (,r 8) provided that such claim "shall constitute a 
binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the Hardy [Lenders]." The Hardy Parties 
bargained for these provisions and included them in the Settlement Order. For purposes of 
claims to recover assets fraudulently transfeITed by Rindlesbach to family members, it is 
important that the Hardy Lenders' standing to seek avoidance of transfers based on a claim 
against Rindlesbach that arose prior to the transfers in question (see Utah Code Ann. § 25-
6-6(1) be clearly established. Their claim under the Guaranty arose in May 2007, prior to 
any of the transfers in question. 
The difficulty that is sure to arise in the context of fraudulent transfer avoidance 
actions is that the transferee family members will argue that the Hardy Lenders have no 
claim against Rindlesbach based on the Guaranty and will invoke the trial court's Order of 
Dismissal as having preclusive effect on that issue. For that reason, the Hardy Lenders 
9 
bargained with the Trustee for his commitment to stipulate to reversal or vacatur of the 
Order of Dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court granted such authority. The purpose of such 
reversal is to bring the final outcome in the Third District Court into alignment with the 
Hardy Lenders' Settlement Agreement with the Trustee and the Settlement Order of the 
Bankruptcy Court, thereby avoiding a dispute that would otherwise arise because of the 
apparent conflict between the Order of Dismissal and the Settlement Order. Thus, the 
Hardy Lenders request reversal as per their stipulation with the Trustee in order to enable 
them to receive the full benefit of their settlement. From a policy standpoint, it is desirable 
to allow creditors to avoid the fraudulent transfer of assets rather than helping enable the 
transferees of such transfers to achieve a windfall and unjust enrichment. 
The stipulated resolution of the appeal as requested in the Motion to Reverse is also 
desirable from the standpoint of minimizing the burden on the judiciary so that the Court 
can focus its attention on matters that are actually contested by persons having standing to 
argue them. 1 More importantly, a stipulated resolution is desirable to allow the actual 
patiies to the controversy to resolve issues as they choose and to avoid unnecessary 
litigation expense. See Nea,y v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 834 P .2d 119, 125 
1 In view of the Trustee's succession to Rindlesbach's right to compromise and settle 
litigation to which Rindlesbach was a party prior to his bankruptcy, the Tmstee has been 
substituted in this appeal in the place of Rindlesbach. As a result, Rindlesbach has no 
standing to oppose the relief sought in this case. His vigorous opposition to substitution of 
the Trustee and to the Motion to Reverse appear to be motivated by his desire to preserve 
fraudulent transfers to members of his family, providing fmiher evidence of the fraudulent 
intent behind such transfers. 
10 
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(California 1992)2 (in bank) ("We hold that, when the parties to an action agree to settle 
their dispute and as part of their settlement stipulate to a reversal of the trial com1judgment, 
the Court of Appeal should grant their request for the stipulated reversal absent a showing 
of extraordinary circumstances that warrant an exception to this general rule."). In Nea,y, 
the California Supreme Court reversed a decision of the California Court of Appeal 
refusing to grant a stipulated reversal of the trial court judgment. Its reasoning is 
persuasive: 
Requiring parties to continue to litigate a matter over which there is no longer 
a real dispute "is wasteful of the resources of the judiciary." (Federal Data 
C01p. v. SMS Data Products Group (Fed.Cir.1987) 819 F.2d 277, 280 
[ directing administrative agency to vacate decision after parties settled].) Our 
appellate courts' own policies demonstrate this point. In 1985, one-half of the 
Courts of Appeal had no settlement program, either fonnal or informal. (Cal. 
Civil Appellate Practice (2d ed., Cont.Ed.Bar 1985) § 11.1, p. 329.) Four 
years later, settlement conference procedures were in place in every Court of 
Appeal with two exceptions. (Eisenberg, Cal.Practice Guide: Civil Appeals 
& Writs (The Rutter Group) if 6:2, p. 6-1.) At present, every Court of Appeal 
provides for settlement conferences, reflecting the now uniform recognition 
that the policy favoring settlement continues after judgment. Even more 
telling is the fact that Courts of Appeal throughout the state, including 
the Court of Appeal in this case, have routinely granted the parties' 
requests for stipulated reversals and similar procedures to effectuate 
settlement agreements. The principle that even a belated settlement saves 
resources is also well recognized in the federal courts. (Federal Data Co11J. 
v. SMS Data Products Group, supra, 819 F.2d 277, 280; Nestle Co., Inc. v. 
Chester's Market, Inc. (2d Cir.1985) 756 F.2d 280, 282-283.) Indeed, "the 
Supreme Comi has summarily vacated judgments in cases settled while 
pending on appeal after a com1 of appeals has refused to do so." (Id., at p. 
282, citing New Left Ed. Pro}. v. Board of Reg. of the U. of Tex. s:rs. (5th 
Cir.1973) 472 F.2d 218, vacated 414 U.S. 807, 94 S.Ct. 118, 38 L.Ed.2d 43.) 
2 Superseded by statute as noted in Hardisty v. Hinton & A(fert, 124 Cal. App. 4th 999, 
l 005-06, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835, 838-39 (2004), as modified (Jan. 4, 2005) 
I 1 
Simple fairness requires that the first and most weighty 
consideration be given to the parties' interests and that they be 
accommodated except in the extraordinary. case. The parties are the 
persons ( or entities) most affected by a judgment, which is the ultimate 
product of their sustained effmi and expense. Homilies about "judicial 
integrity" and "legal truth" will ring hollow in the ears of the parties. The 
courts exist for litigants. Litigants do not exist for courts. 
Id. at 121, 122-23 (bold emphasis added) (citation omitted from last paragraph). 
Like California, Utah has established an Appellate Mediation Office for the purpose 
of facilitating resolution of appeals. See Utah R. App. P. 28A. The settlement reached by 
the Hardy Lenders with the Trustee is entirely consistent with the principles and purposes 
of the appellate mediation program. An optimal mediation program should allow for 
resolution either through consensual dismissal or reversal. 
Apa11 from the issue of Rindlesbach's personal liability, the Hardy Lenders have 
chosen not to pursue their appeal with respect to any of the matters from which their appeal 
was originally taken (inasmuch as there is likely to be no benefit from adding additional 
finance charges to their existing Judgment, which cannot be fully satisfied in any event). 
Thus, reversal of the Order of Dismissal will completely resolve this appeal. 
II. The Trial Court's Ruling that Rindlesbach Has No Personal Liability Under 
the Guaranty Is Contrary to Utah Common Law and to Rules of Statutory 
Construction. 
It has long been the rule at common law that a trnstee is personally liable for every 
obligation he incurs in his capacity as trustee unless he expressly stipulates that he is not 
to be personally responsible and that the other party must look solely to the trust estate. 
E.g., Taylor v. Mayo, I IO U.S. 330, 335 (1884) ("The trust estate cannot promise; the 
contract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trnstee. As a trustee holds the estate, 
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although only with the power and for the purpose of managing it, he is personally bound 
by the contracts he makes as trustee, even when designating himself as such."). 
This continues to be the rule at common law in numerous jurisdictions. E.g., Societe 
Generale v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 325 F.Supp. 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd sub nom. 
Societe Generale v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 144 F. App'x 191 (2d Cir. 2005) ("New York 
law presumes that in a contract between a trustee and a third party, personal liability on 
behalf of the trustee attaches unless the contracting parties have clearly agreed 
otherwise."); Maine Shipyard &Marine Ry. v. Lilley, 2000 ME 9, ,r,r 13-16, 743 A.2d 1264, 
1268-69 (Maine 2000) ("The court did not err when it held Daniel Lilley jointly liable with 
the Lilley Trust for unjust enrichment. At common law, the trustee 'has full and primary 
liability."'); First Eastern Bank, NA. v. Jones, 413 Mass. 654, 658-63, 602 N.E.2d 211, 
214-17 (1992) ("At our common law, a trustee is personally liable on a contract the trustee 
signs on behalf of a trust unless it is agreed that the party entering the contract with the 
trustee shall look only to the trust's assets for payment or damages."); Just Pants v. Bank 
of Ravenswood, 136 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547, 483 N.E.2d 331, 335 (1985) ("Generally, a 
trustee holds legal title to the trust estate and deals with it as principal and is personally 
liable on his contracts."); Colorado Springs Cablevision, Inc. v. Lively, 579 F. Supp. 252, 
255 n.6 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Even if Lively was being sued solely in his individual capacity, 
the complaint should not be dismissed. It is a generally accepted rule that a trustee may be 
personally liable to third patties for obligations incutTed during the administration of a 
trust."); Taylor v. Richmond's New Approach Ass'n, Inc., 351 So. 2d 1094, 1095-96 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("Traditionally, trustees of all kinds have been held to be personally 
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liable to third persons on obligations incun-ed on behalf of their trust unless there is a 
specific agreement against personal liability."). 3 
Cmrent legal encylopedias also reflect the same common law rule. E.g., 16A 
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 8254 (2014) ("It is the general rule that trustees bind themselves 
personally by their contracts with third persons, unless they are exempted from liability by 
special provisions in the trust agreement or stipulations in a contract that are binding on 
the other party."); 90A C.J.S. Trusts § 387 (2014) ("As a general rule, a contractual 
obligation entered into by a trustee with respect to the trust is binding on, and enforceable 
against, the trustee personally."); 12 Am.Jur.2d Business Trusts§ 63 ("In the absence of a 
stipulation or agreement to the contrary, the trustees of a business trust are personally liable 
for debts incun-ed and on contracts made by them on behalf of the trust."). 
Utah's Supreme Court followed the closely analogous common law rule that a 
guardian is personally liable on a contract entered into in his capacity as guardian for the 
benefit of his ward. Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 246, 258-59 (Utah 1901 ). 4 While no 
3 Taylor involved a business trust. Even though Florida had adopted section 7-306 of the 
Uniform Probate Code ( containing a provision substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-1010(1)) in 1975, the comi ruled that it did not apply to a business trust but only to 
"those acting as trustee under the classical testamentary or inter vivas trust." 351 So.2d at 
1096. 
4 Andrus was superseded by statute when the Utah Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1975. See Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-429(1), which provides that "Unless otherwise 
provided in the contract, a conservator is not individually liable on a contract properly 
entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he 
fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract." The 
language of this statute closely parallels that of Unifonn Probate Code§ 7-306, which was 
adopted in Utah at the same time and codified as Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-306 (1953). By 
statutory definition, Section 75-7-306 was limited in its application to the types of trusts 
specified in Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55), originally codified as§ 75-1-201(45). 
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other published decision from Utah's courts has been found, federal courts in Utah held 
that Utah law is consistent with the common law rule discussed above. See Pan American 
Petroleum Corp. v. Gibbons, 168 F.Supp. 867 (1958) (applying Utah law), affinned in 
Gibbons v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1958). In that case, 
the court stated that "[t]he general rule is that a trustee is personally and primarily liable 
upon his contracts as trustee and that he can be sued upon them as an individual, without 
prejudice to his right to seek contribution from those for whom he has acted." Id. at 876-
77. In affirming the District Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
held that "a trustee does not enjoy liability limited to his capacity as trustee in his 
contractual relationships with third persons." 262 F.2d at 855-56. 
Turning to the principles of statutory construction, they support the conclusion that 
the common law rule as to the personal liability of a trustee continues to govern those trusts 
that were excluded from the definition of a bust when the Uniform Probate Code was 
adopted in Utah. The Unifo1m Probate Code effected a comprehensive refo1m of the laws 
governing probate matters and trusts of the kind typically used in estate planning practice, 
such as testamentary trusts and inter vivos trusts. One such reform was to circumscribe a 
trustee's exposure to personal liability on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity. 
Thus, Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-306 (enacted 1975, Utah Laws 709-10; Laws 1975, c. 150, 
§ 8, EFF. July 1, 1977), provided in pe11inent pm1 as follows: 
( 1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not 
personally liable on contracts properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity 
in the course of administration of the trust estate unless he fails to reveal his 
representative capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract. 
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At the same time, however, the Utah Legislature narrowly defined a "trust" for purposes 
of the new probate code, as follows: 
"Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, with additions 
thereto, wherever and however created. It also includes a ttust created or 
determined by judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered 
in the manner of an express trust. "Trust" excludes other constructive trusts, 
and it excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives, 
trust accounts as defined in chapter 6, custodial arrangements pursuant to 
chapter 15 of title 75 (the Uniform Gifts To Minors Act) or part 6 of chapter 
5 of this code, business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to 
beneficiaries, common trust funds, voting trusts, security arrangements, 
liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, 
dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee 
benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee 
or escrowee for another. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(45) (emphasis added) (1977 version per 1975 Utah Laws 585-
86; Laws 1975, c. 150, section 2, eff. July 1, 1977). This definition applied to the kinds of 
trusts that were typically involved in probate matters and estate planning practice, while 
excluding business trusts and retirement trusts ( among others). That was a logical choice 
in view of the subject matter of the probate code. It may also have been a wise policy choice 
to protect tmstees serving under testamentary and other family trusts from personal liability 
because such trustees are often unsophisticated, unrepresented by counsel and/or 
uncompensated for their services. The Utah Legislature made clear that"[ u]nless displaced 
by the pa1iicular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its 
provisions." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103 ( enacted 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently summarized some cardinal rules of statutory 
construction in Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, 1if 13-14, 267 P.3d 
863, 866, stating: 
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It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory 
interpretation, "our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of 
the Legislature." "The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain 
language of the statute itself.' " Thus, "[ w ]hen interpreting a statute, we 
assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each term 
advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning." 
Additionally, we "presume[ ] that the expression of one [term] should be 
interpreted as the exclusion of another." We therefore seek to give effect to 
omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Thus, the courts must presume that business trusts, retirement trusts 
and certain other trust relationships expressly omitted from the definition of a trust in Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(55) were purposefully excluded from the coverage of Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-306, leaving those trusts subject to the common law regarding personal 
liability of a trustee. That conclusion is also consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103, 
which expressly left the common law ("principles oflaw and equity") in place except where 
displaced by particular provisions of the code. 
More recently in 2004, the Utah Legislature again revisited the issue of personal 
liability of trustees when it repealed Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306. 2004 Utah Laws 365; 
Laws 2004, c. 89, § 122, eff. July 1, 2004. At the same time, the legislature enacted the 
Uniform Trust Code, which is codified as Utah Code Ann.§§ 75-7-101 to -1201. 2004 
Utah Laws 363-64; Laws 2004, c. 89, § 115, Eff. July 1, 2004. The new Trust Code slightly 
modified the provision concerning personal liability of trustees: 
Except as otheiwise provided in the contract, a tmstee is not 
personally liable on a contract properly entered into in the tmstee's fiduciary 
capacity in the course of administering the trust if the trustee in the contract 
disclosed the fiduciary capacity. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-1010(1) (1993). Even though this new language enlarged 
somewhat the protection of trustees compared with the predecessor statute, Section 75-7-
17 
306, the Utah Legislature specifically provided for the common law to continue in force 
except as modified by the statute or laws of the State: 
The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this 
chapter, except to the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-106. Further, in the 2004 enactment of the Uniform Trust Code the 
legislature provided that "[t]erms not specifically defined in this section have the meanings 
provided in Section 75-1-201." Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-103(2). This provision continued 
in force the limited definition of "trust" found in Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55), thereby 
excluding business trusts and retirement trusts from the scope of the Uniform Trust Code. 
Once again, the pertinent rule of statutory interpretation is that the omission of such trusts 
from the limited liability provision of Section 75-7-1010(1) was purposeful. That 
conclusion is reinforced by the express directive of Section 75-7-106 that the common law 
continues to apply except as expressly displaced by the new statute. By virtue of the limited 
definition of a ttust used for purposes of the new statute, the common law mle of personal 
liability continues to govem a retirement ttust. 
The trial court's opinion did not rely on any Utah precedent but rather looked 
exclusively to other jurisdictions for precedent. Further, it improperly distinguished Andrus 
v. Blazzard, supra, which applied precisely the same common law rule as advocated by the 
Hardy Lenders, albeit in the technically different context of a guardianship. Finally, the 
trial court incon-ectly relied on Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1010(1) as if it were controlling 
authority even though it is clearly inapplicable to a retirement trust. The trial court's 
analysis was flawed and led to an enoneous conclusion. 
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Conclusion and Relief Sought 
The Hardy Lenders and the Trustee, who stands in Rindlesbach's shoes by reason 
of his decision to seek relief in the Bankruptcy Court, have compromised and settled any 
dispute as to the validity and amount of the Hardy Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach. The 
Motion to Reverse based on their Stipulation to Reverse should be granted. 
If the Court nevertheless wishes to consider the merits of the Order of Dismissal, 
that order should be reversed. It is the common law rule in Utah that a trustee is personally 
liable on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity. Both when the Utah Legislature 
enacted the Uniform Probate Code in 197 5 and when it repealed and replaced parts of it 
with the Uniform Trust Code in 2004, it narrowly defined "trust" to exclude retirement 
trusts and expressly mandated that the common law would continue to apply except as 
modified by statute. Thus, the common law rule that a trustee of a trust that falls outside 
the Uniform Trust Code's definition of a trust, such as a retirement trust, is personally liable 
on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity remains in force. 
The Court should reverse the Order of Dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. In view of the bankruptcy discharge that was granted to Rindlesbach, the 
Hardy Lenders anticipate that the only further proceeding that will be needed in the trial 
com1 is the dismissal of their claim against Rindlesbach without prejudice, the matter 
having been resolved by the Bankruptcy Cami's Settlement Order. 
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DATED this 29th day of December, 2014. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
A Professional Corporation 
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Certificate of Compliance with Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l) 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Brief, exclusive of cover sheet, table of 
contents, table of authorities and addendum, contains 5,745 words, as determined by the 
word count feature of Microsoft Word. 
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1. 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
In re Mark Rindlesbach, Bankmptcy Case No. 13-30662 (JTM), Dkt. No. 358, 
Order Granting Trustee's Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlement between 
the Tmstee and the Hardy Parties and (2) Settlement Between the Trustee and the 
Lexon Parties 
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Bankruptcy No. 13-30552 (JTM) 
Chapter 7 
ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE'S MOTIONS FOR ORDER APPROVING: 
(1) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE HARDY PARTIES AND 
(2) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE LEXON PARTIES 
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Trustee's Motion for Order 
Approving Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy Parties [Docket No. 291] (the 
"Hardy Motion") and (2) Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Settlement Between the 
Trustee and the Lexon Parties [Docket No. 292] (the "Lexon Motion") (collectively, the 






Case 13-30552 Doc 358 Filed 07/21/14 Entered 07/21/1416:14:29 Desc Pending 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 2 of 40 
of the bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the "Debtor"). Through the Motions the 
Trustee requests that the Court approve the settlement agreements (the "Agreements") 
between the Trustee and The Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit 
Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse P.S.P., MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah 
Investments, LLC, David D. Smith, Steven Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW 
Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and D.R.P. Management PSP (collectively, the 
"Hardy Parties") and between the Trustee and Lexon Surety Group, LLC, Bond 
Safeguard Insurance Company, and Lexon Insurance Company (collectively, the 
"Lexon Parties"). 
For the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued 
contemporaneously with this Order, it is hereby 
ORDERED that: 
1. This Order constitutes a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a); 
2. The Motions are GRANTED in their entirety; 
3. All objections to the Motions, that have not been withdrawn, waived, or 
settled, and all reservations or rights included therein, are hereby overruled on the 
merits; 
4. The Agreements, attached as Exhibit A, are approved in their entirety, and 
the Trustee is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to 
consummate the Agreements; 
2 
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5. The Lexon Parties' claim against the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the 
"Estate") is allowed in a reduced amount which is the greater of (a) $350,000, or (b) the 
sum of all allowed claims against the Estate (other than the subordinated claim of the 
Hardy Parties) multiplied by 85%, up to a maximum amount of $930,000 (the "Lexon 
Allowed Claim"); 
6. Claim 15-1 is disallowed to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the 
Lexon Allowed Claim; 
7. The Hardy Parties' claim against the Estate is allowed as a subordinated 
claim in the reduced amount of $4,000,000, which shall be subordinated in priority to all 
other allowed unsecured claims against the Estate which are not subordinated under 11 
U.S.C. § 51 0(c) or otherwise (the "Subordinated Claim"); 
8. The Subordinated Claim shall be allowed in the following component 
parts, each of which shall constitute a binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the 
Hardy Parties: 
A. $2,610,000 for the amount asserted in the Hardy Parties' proof of 
claim ("Hardy Parties' Claim") arising from the Hardy Parties' contention that the Debtor 
is personally liable to them; 
B. $1,390,000.00 for the amount asserted in the Hardy Parties' Claim 
arising from the Hardy Parties' contention that assets were transferred by the 
Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the "PSP") and the Rindlesbach 
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C. $0 for the amount of punitive damages asserted in the Hardy 
Parties' Claim arising from the fraudulent transfers; 
9. All other claims by the Hardy Parties are disallowed to the extent they 
exceed the Subordinated Claim; 
10. The Trustee shall have no obligation to administer assets or seek 
recoveries for the purpose of payment of the Subordinated Claim, except as may be 
incidental to the administration of the Estate for the benefit of creditors other than the 
Hardy Parties; 
11. The Trustee shall have no obligation to file, join as a party, or prosecute 
any action that may be assigned to the Hardy Parties pursuant to the Agreements; 
however, the Trustee may choose do so at his discretion upon request of the Hardy 
Parties; 
12. On the Effective Date, upon receipt of payment of the portion of the 
Settlement Amount identified in ,m 1.A. and 1.C. of the Trustee's agreement with the 
Hardy Parties (the "Hardy Agreement"), the Trustee shall assign, transfer and convey to 
the Hardy Parties any and all assets of the Estate (including assets that become or are 
determined to be property of the Estate after the Effective Date) other than the 
Settlement Amount, and any claims and causes of action available to the Trustee or the 
Estate, including without limitation any claims and causes of action arising out of 
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under Utah Code Ann.§ 25-6-1 et seq. and any 
and all rights to seek substantive consolidation of any other entity with the Debtor (the 
4 
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"Estate Claims") to the Hardy Parties, which Estate Claims shall not include the 
Trustee's right to object to the Debtor's discharge under § 727; 1 
13. The automatic stay is modified, effective upon the expiration of 14 days 
after the entry of this Order (except as otherwise stated herein), in the following 
respects: 
A. To allow prosecution of the claims in adversary proceeding 
numbers· 13-02399 and 13-02400, including prosecution thereof following remand to the 
Third District Court, for any purpose other than collecting money from the Estate or the 
Debtor, and to allow the Third District Court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in the contempt proceeding for which an evidentiary hearing was conducted on 
August 26, 2013; 
B. To allow prosecution and resolution of the pending appeal 
designated as Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, et al., vs. Mark Lee Rindlesbach, 
Trustee of the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, and Mark Lee 
Rindlesbach, individually, Case No. 20130390 in the Utah Court of Appeals, including 
entry of any order or the taking of any other action deemed appropriate by that court; 
C. To allow the Hardy Parties to pursue any claim for avoidance and 
recovery of any pre-petition fraudulent transfer as against Brenda Rindlesbach or any 
1 As the Hardy Parties are not in control or possession of the approximately $23,507 held by Lake Forest 
Bank and Trust ("Lake Forest"), the Hardy Parties are not obligated to remit this portion of the Settlement 
Amount to the Trustee on the Effective Date, identified in Paragraph 1.B. of the Hardy Agreement, to 
trigger the Trustee's obligations to the Hardy Parties found in the Hardy Agreement and explained in this 
paragraph; however, the Hardy Parties have the duty to cooperate with the Trustee and to assist the 
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other transferee of the Debtor's property, including subsequent transferees, and any 
person for whose benefit a transfer was made; and 
D. To allow further proceedings in Case No. 080913314 upon remand 
from the Utah Court of Appeals consistent with its disposition of the appeal, including 
entry of a judgment against the Debtor pursuant to stipulation between the Hardy 
Parties and the Trustee; 
14. The Trustee is authorized to perform any and all promises and obligations 
undertaken by him in the Agreements, including the following: 
A. Stipulate to (1) entry of an order directing the Clerk of the Third 
District Court to disburse $400,000 from the proceeds from the Tooele Property to the 
Trustee and to disburse the remaining funds held by the Third District Court in 
connection with Case No. 130900183 to Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler in trust for the 
Hardy Parties; (2) stipulate to orders remanding adversary proceedings 13-2399 and 
13-2400 to the Utah state courts from which the actions were removed; and (3) after 
remand, stipulate to disbursement of the funds held by the Third District Court in the 
manner described above in such removed adversary proceedings; 
B. Stipulate to the entry of a consent order in the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversing or vacating summary judgment in favor of the Debtor and remanding 
the case to the district court (with the remaining aspects of the appeal being dismissed) 
in Case NO. 080913314 (the "Guaranty Case"); 
C. Upon remand of the Guaranty Case, stipulate to the entry of a 
judgment against the Debtor in the amount of $2,610,000 ("Stipulated Judgment") 
6 
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consistent with the terms of the Hardy Agreement, including the subordination of the 
Stipulated Judgment to all other allowed claims in the above-captioned bankruptcy 
case; 
D. For the sake of clarity, by authorizing the Trustee to take the 
actions identified above in ,m 14.A.-C., this Court is not ordering the state courts (or 
other courts) in which the actions are pending to take any specific action but instead is 
authorizing the Trustee to consent to the actions identified in 1r,J 14.A.-C.; and 
15. This Court will retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy, dispute or 
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES TO BE SERVED 
Service of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE'S MOTIONS FOR 
ORDER APPROVING: (1) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE 
HARDY PARTIES AND (2) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE 
LEXON PARTIES shall be served to the following parties in the manner designated 
below: 
By Electronic Service to the Following: 
• Matthew L. Anderson manderson@fabianlaw.com, mbeck@fabianlaw.com 
• Jesse A.P. Baker ecfutb@piteduncan.com, jbaker@piteduncan.com 
• Jonathan Firmage jsf@pkhlawyers.com 
• Peter W. Guyon pguyon@yahoo.com 
• Arnold L. Graff agraff@piteduncan.com, ecfutb@piteduncan.com 
• George B. Hofmann gbh@pkhlawyers.com, 
dh@pkhlawyers.com;tm@pkh lawyers.com 
• Philip G. Jones tr PGJonesT@theomphalos.com, 
pjones@ecf.epiqsystems.com 
• Stacy J McNeil! smcneill@btjd.com 
• Mark S. Middlemas ecfmaildistgroup@lundbergfirm.com, 
lundbergBK@gmail.com,mark.middlemas@lundbergfirm.com 
• John T. Morgan tr john.t.morgan@usdoj.gov, 
James.Gee@usdoj.gov;Lindsey.Huston@usdoj.gov;Suzanne.Verhaal@usdoj.gov 
• David L. Pinkston bankruptcy_dlp@scmlaw.com 
• Jeremy C. Sink jsink@mbt-law.com 
• Steven C. Strong scs@pkhlawyers.com, jh@pkhlawyers.com 
• James C. Swindler jcs@princeyeates.com, carolp@princeyeates.com 
• Paul James Toscano ptoscano@expresslaw.com, ptpcecf@gmail.com 
• James K. Tracy jtracy@btjd.com, docketing@btjd.com;aellis@btjd.com 
• United States Trustee USTPRegion19.SK.ECF@usdoj.gov 
• Mark S. x2Middlemas ecfmaildistgroup@lundbergfirm.com, 
kent.plott@lundbergfirm.com;lundbergbk@gmail.com 
• Alan F. Mecham mechamlaw@hotmail.com 
By U.S. Mail: In addition to the parties of record receiving notice through the CM/ECF 
system, the following parties should be served notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b): 
first-class, postage prepaid to the following: 
{00195199.DOCX /} 
Bradley W. Christopherson 
Hayes Godfrey Bell, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South 
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Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Todd J. Godfrey 
Mazuran & Hayes 
2118 East 3900 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Mark Hashimoto 
Piercy Bowler Taylor & Kern 
9980 South 300 West Ste 200 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Mark A. Springer 
Springer & Company, PLLC 
3 Snow Forest Lane 
Sandy, UT 84092 
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EXHIBIT A 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement") Is made as of May:2_ ( , 2014, by 
and among Philip G. Jones {the 11Trustee11) 1 in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the 11Debtor"), and The Ruth B. Hardy 
Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse 
P.S.P., MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah Investments, LLC, David D. Smith, Steven 
Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and 
D.R.P. Management PSP (collectively, the 'Hardy Parties"). The Trustee and the Hardy 
Parties are referred to herein as the "Parties." 
BACKGROUND 
Whereas, on September 13, 2013, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the 11Court'1), commencing case 
number 13-30552 (the 11Case1'); 
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 13, 2014, the Case was 
converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was 
appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the 11 Estate"); 
Whereas, currently on deposit with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court ii:, 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in connection with an action entitled Ruth B. 
Hardy Revocable Trust, et al. vs. Brenda N. Rindlesbach, et al., Case No. 130900183 
{the 11Salt Lake County Action") are the proceeds of three checks, in the amounts of 
$400,000, $1,763,025 and $3,700, respectively. The $400,000 check represents a 
portion of the proceeds of the sale of property formerly owned by the Rindlesbach 
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Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the 11 PSP") located in Tooele County, Utah (the 
"Tooele Property"). The other two checks represent a portion of the proceeds of 
property located in West Jordan, Utah (the "West Jordan Property11), record title to which 
was formerly held by the Rindlesbach Construction Employees Pension Plan (the 
"Pension Plan"); 
Whereas, a part of the proceeds of the Tooele Property was used to purchase a 
certificate of deposit at Lake Forest Bank, and the Trustee and the Hardy Parties 
believe that approximately $23,507 remains of that certificate of deposit (the "Lake 
Forest Account"); 
Whereas, in connection with the Case, the Hardy Parties have previously 
obtained relief from the automatic stay with respect to 5.2328 shares in the West Smith 
Ditch Water Company (the "Water Stock'\ which has been exchanged for banked water 
entitlements for use in Elk Ridge, Utah, and the Hardy Parties are currently liquidating 
the banked water entitlements in cooperation with the Trustee; 
Whereas, the Trustee has been informed that the the Debtor loaned more than 
$500,000 to the PSP before the Petition Date (the "PSP Loan")~ 
Whereas, the Hardy Parties assert an unsecured claim against the Estate in an 
amount of $17,524,705.13 (the '1Hardy Parties Claim"), comprised of the following 
components: 
A. $7,030,836.74 based on the Hardy Parties' assertion that the Debtor is 
personally liable for the judgment the Hardy Parties secured in 2012 against the PSP, in 
the case of Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, et al., vs. Robert A Jones, et al., Case No. 
080913314 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
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(th_e "Guaranty Case")1 which is the subject of a pending appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (the 11Personal Liability Claim"); 1 
B. A claim for the value of the assets transferred by the PSP or the Pension 
Plan to or for the benefit of the Debtor, including the proceeds of the West Jordan 
Property and the Tooele Property, interest on each transfer at the legal rate and 
attorney fees incurred in seeking avoidance of such transfers, which claim is in the 
amount of $3,592,703.24 (the "Fraudulent Transfer Claim"), which claim is to be 
reduced by any recovery the Hardy Parties are able to obtain on fraudulent transfer 
claims. $317,533.75 of that amount is duplicative of the attorney fees included in 
paragraph A above; and 
C. A claim for punitive damages that may be awarded as a result of the 
fraudulent transfers described above, in an estimated amount of $5,000,000 (the 
"Punitive Damage Claim"). 
Whereas, the Trustee disputes aspects of the Hardy Parties' Claim, and asserts 
that grounds may exist to equitably subordinate the Hardy Parties' Claim under 
Bankruptcy Code§ 510(c), and the Hardy Parties deny that there is any basis for 
equitable subordination of their claims. 
Whereas, mutually desiring to avoid the burdens, risks and expenses of potential 
litigation between themselves, the Parties have entered into this Agreement to facilitate 
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and 
finally resolve and settle any and all disputes between and among themselves; 
1 This amount includes estimated attorneys' fees of $533,602.49 in enforcing the judgment. In addition, if 
the Hardy Parties' appeal with respect to the 12% finance charge is successful, the Hardy Parties assert 
that the Debtor's liability on this claim would be $9,249,535.64. 
{00191473.DOC/2} 3 
Case 13-30552 Doc 358 Filed 07/21/14 Entered 07/21/14 16:14:29 
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen 
Desc Pending 
Page 14 of 40 
Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and creditors that 
will be received as a result of the settlement of these matters, particularly in light of the 
costs, uncertainties and risks of further litigation, and has concluded that the settlement 
contained herein is (i) fair and equitable, (ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties' 
disputes, and (iii) in the best interests of the Estate and its creditors. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration as provided herein, 
the legal sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound 
hereby, the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Payment to Estate. The Hardy Parties will request, or in the case of the 
Lake Forest Account will consent to, payment to the Trustee, in the aggregate amount 
of $500,000 (the "Se~lement Amount") to be paid to the Trustee on behalf of the Estate 
on or before August 31, 2014. For clarity, the Trustee's obligations under this 
Agreement are contingent upon his timely receipt of the portions of the Settlement 
Amount described in subparagraphs A and C below. The Settlement Amount shall be 
derived from assets of the Profit Sharing Plan, shall constitute the repayment of a 
portion of the PSP Loan, and shall be comprised of the following components: 
2. 
A. $400 1000 from the proceeds of the Tooele Property; 
B. $23,507 from the Lake Forest Account; and 
C. $76.493, or more as necessary to complete payment to the Trustee 
in the total amount of $500,000, from the proceeds of the banked water 
entitlements derived from the Water Stock. 
Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Certain Claims. The Parties agree 
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shall be subordinated in priority to all other allowed unsecured claims against the Estate 
which are not subordinated under 11 U.S.C. § 51 O(c) or otherwise (the "Subordinated 
Claim"). Such subordination is limited to the treatment of the Hardy Parties Claim in the 
Case and such claim is not subordinated for any other purpose or in any other context. 
Except as specifically allowed and subordinated by this paragraph, the Hardy Parties 
Claim shall be disallowed in its entirety. The Subordinated Claim shall be allowed in the 
following component parts, each of which shall constitute a binding obligation of the 





The Personal Liability Claim in the amount of $2,610.000.00; 
The Fraudulent Transfer Claim in the amount of $1,390,000.00; and 
The Punitive Damages Claim in the amount of $0. 
Release by Trustee. On the Effective Date, the Trustee, for himself and 
on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate {the "Debtor Releasers"), shall and hereby does 
fully, finally and forever release and discharge the Hardy Parties and their 
representatives. principals and attorneys of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, 
crossclaims, actions, causes of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, 
promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, 
controversies, obligations, liabilities, damages, judgments, executions, liens, 
encumbrances, claims for contribution and indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any 
nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, 
asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the 
Debtor Releasors at any time has had, owned or held from the beginning of the world 
through the date of this Agreement against any of the Hardy Parties or any of their 
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representatives. principals or attorneys by reason of any matter, cause, occurrence, 
fact, thing, act or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any 
matter or event whatsoever, past or present (except for any obligations arising under 
this Agreement) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
11 Debtor Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the Trustee hereby irrevocably 
waives the right to commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other 
proceeding against the Hardy Parties or any of their representatives, principals or 
attorneys relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Claims. 
4. Release By Hardy Parties in favor of Trustee. On the Effective Date, the 
Hardy Parties shall and hereby do fully, finally and forever release and discharge the 
Trustee and the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the 
11Hardy Releasees") of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, 
causes of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, 
dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities, 
damages, judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and 
indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, 
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or 
contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the Hardy Parties at any time has had, 
owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement 
against any of the Hardy Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, occurrence, fact, 
thing, act or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or 
event wh~tsoever, past or present (except for any obligations arising under this 
Agreement and except for the Subordinated Claim) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter 
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collectively referred to as the 11Hardy Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the 
Hardy Parties hereby waive the right to commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, 
action or other proceeding against the Hardy Releasees relating to, arising from or in 
connection with the Hardy Claims. The Hardy Parties reserve all claims and causes of 
action whatsoever against any party other than the Hardy Releasees. 
5. No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not 
assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in, or conveyed the 
Debtor Claims or any interest therein to any person or entity. (b) The Hardy Parties 
represent and warrant that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a 
security interest in, or conveyed the Hardy Claims or any interest therein to any person 
or entity. 
6. Trustee's Administration of the Estate. The Hardy Parties agree and 
consent that the Trustee shall have no obligation to administer assets or seek 
recoveries for the purpose of payment of the Subordinated Claim except as the same 
may be incidental to the administration of the estate for the benefit of other creditors. 
The Trustee shall have no obligation to file, join as a party, or prosecute any action that 
may be assigned to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement, but reserves the right 
to do so upon request of the Hardy Parties. The Hardy Parties agree, absent the 
Trustee's consent, not to join the Trustee as a party to any action that may be assigned 
to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement. 
7. Assignment of Assets, Claims and Causes of Action to the Hardy Parties. 
Upon the Effective Date, the Trustee shall assign, transfer and convey to the Hardy 
Parties any and all assets of the Estate (including assets that become or are determined 
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to be property of the Estate after the Effective Date) other than the Settlement Amount 
(the "Estate Assets") and any and all claims and caus~s of action of or available to the 
Trustee or the Estate (the "Estate Claims"), including without limitation any claims and 
causes of action arising out of Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq. and any and all rights to seek substantive consolidation of any 
other entity with the Debtor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Hardy 
Parties recover any money solely as a result of the assertion of any of the Estate 
Claims, they agree to pay five percent (5%) of the net amount of such recovery (i.e., net 
of any attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses incurred in prosecuting 
any of the Estate Claims): (a) to the Trustee if this Case remains opens at the time of 
the recovery or (b) if this Case has been closed, to the holders of allowed unsecured 
claims in the Case in proportion to the allowed amounts of such claims to the extent 
such claims have not been paid in full, but the Hardy Parties shall not be required to pay 
more than the allowed amount of any such claim. 
8. Representations and Warranties. {a) The Trustee represents and· 
warrants that he has not assigned, transferred, encumb~red, granted a security interest 
in, or conveyed the Estate Assets or any interest therein to any person or entity. (b) 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement and except as provided in 
section 8(a) above, the Estate Assets will be transferred "as is/' 11where is," and 11 if is" in 
all respects; neither the Trustee nor any of his agents, attorneys, or representatives 
have made or makes any warranty or representation whatsoever regarding the Estate 
Claims, or any other matter in any way related to the Estate Claims, including, but not 
limited to, title to the Estate Claims, use, value, or any other condition of the Estate 
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Claims. The Hardy Parties agree that they are not relying on and hereby specifically 
waive any claim of liability based on any statement, representation, warranty, promise, 
covenant, or undertaking by the Trustee or any other person representing or purporting 
to represent the Trustee in connection with the transfer of the Estate Claims. BY 
SIGNING BELOW, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION B(a) ABOVE,THE HARDY 
PARTIES EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, 
EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR STATUTORY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSFER OF 
THE ESTATE CLAIMS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY OF 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
9. Cooperation. The Trustee and the Hardy Parties agree to cooperate in 
seeking the following relief and executing any additional documents that are reasonably 
required to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. The Parties recognize that the 
outcome of litigation cannot be guaranteed (hence the failure to obtain any of the 
following relief described in this paragraph shall not constitute a breach of this 
Agreement), and the Parties shall not be required to expend unlimited or unreasonable 
amounts of attorneys' fees to obtain such relief specified or its reasonable equivalent: 
A. In removed adversary proceedings pending under case numbers 13-2399 
and 13-2400, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will stipulate to: (i) an order directing 
the Clerk of the Third District Court to disburse $400,000 from the proceeds of the 
Tooele Property to the Trustee and to disburse the remainder of the funds held in 
connection with either of those proceedings to Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler in trust for 
the Hardy Parties and (ii) an order remanding those proceedings to Utah state courts. 
Upon remand, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will likewise stipulate to the 
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disbursement of the funds held in connection with those proceedings consistent with 
this Agreement (as provided in Section 9.A(i) above). 
B. In connection with the pending appeal by the Hardy Parties from the 
Guaranty Case, the Trustee and the Hardy Parties will stipulate to the entry of a consent 
order by the Cou~ of Appeals reversing the order granting summary judgment in favor 
of the Debtor and remanding the case (with the remaining aspects of the appeal being 
dismissed). 
C. Upon remand of the Guaranty Case from the Court of Appeals, the Hardy 
Parties and the Trustee will stipulate to entry of a judgment against the Debtor in the 
amount of $2,610,000.00 consistent with the terms of this Agreement (provided that 
notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the stipulated judgment shall 
remain subordinated to all other allowed claims for purposes of the Case). 
D. The Tru~tee and the Hardy Parties will share between them any 
documents obtained from the Debtor or any third parties (subject to any confidentiality 
obligations the Parties may have) regarding the Debtor's financial affairs. 
In addition, the Party for whose primary benefit the relief above is sought shall.be 
required to perform the work required to seek such relief, but each Party shal! be 
responsible for his/its attorneys fees and costs associated with seeking the relief. 
E. The Hardy Parties shall cooperate with the Trustee in seeking the 
disallowance of any claim against the Estate (other than the Subordinated Claim). 
10. Relief from Automatic Stay. The Parties stipulate to an order of the Court 
granting the following relief from the automatic stay, the granting of which relief is a 
condition to this Agreement: 
{00I91473.DOC / 2} 10 
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A Modification of th~ automatic stay to allow the prosecution of the claims in 
the proceedings pending under case numbers 13-2399 and 13-24001 including 
prosecution thereof following remand, for any purpose other than collecting money from 
the Estate or the Debtor and to allow the Third District Court to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the contempt proceeding for which an evidentiary hearing was 
conducted in August 2013. 
B. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Utah Court of Appeals to 
take the action described in Section 9.B above or any other action it deems appropriate 
in that appeal. 
C. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the entry of the judgment 
described in Section 9.C above. 
D. Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Hardy Parties to pursue any 
previously asserted or other claim for avoidance and recovery of any alleged pre-
petition fraudulent transfer as against the Debtor's wife or any other transferee of the 
Debtor's property, including subsequent transferees, and any person for whose benefit 
a transfer was made. 
11. Effective Date. As used in this Agreement, the 11Effective Date" shall mean 
the date the Settlement Amount other than the Lake Forest Account is paid in full to the 
Trustee. 
12. Bankruptcy Court Approval. the Lexon Settlement. and Occurrence of the 
Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledged and agree that this Agreement is 
subject to the approval of the Court. If the Court does not approve this Agreement and 
also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Lexon Parties and the Trustee 
{00191473.DOC / 2} 11 
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(the 11 Lexon Agreement'') on or before July 15, 2014, or if the Effective Date does not 
occur on or before September 30, 2014, the terms and conditions of this Agreement 
shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all of their respective rights and claims, 
and nothing contained herein shall be deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies of the 
Parties nor an acknowledgement by any of the Parties as to the respective rights and 
claims as provided for herein or otherwise. The Parties reserve the right to extend 
either or both of the dates specified in this section.by mutual consent. 
t3. Lexon Counterclaims. Effective upon the Effective Date, the Hardy 
Parties assign to the Lexon Parties without warranty or representation any and all 
interest' iri any counterclaim of the Debtor or the PSP in the litigation filed by the City of 
Saratoga Springs on October 6 1 2011 against the Debtor, the PSP, and the Lexon 
Parties (as defined in the Lexon Agreement), known as City of Saratoga Springs v. 
Rindlesbach, et al., Civil No. 110402838, pending in the Fourth Judicial Court for Utah 
County (the "Saratoga Springs Litigation'l The Hardy Parties and the Trustee agree 
not to oppose the motion for relief from stay that has been filed by the City of Saratoga 
Springs to allow that litigation to proceed to conclusion. 
14. Subiect to Fed. R. Evid. 408. The Parties agree that this Agreement is 
entitled to the protections of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
15. No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree that neither the acceptance 
of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be 
construed as an admission of liability or fault by any of the Parties. 
16. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and 
understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and 
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supersedes all prior oral .or written agreements and understandings relating to the 
subject matter hereof. No statement, representation, warranty, covenant or ~greement 
of any kind not expressly set forth in this Agreement shall affect, or be used to interpret, 
change or restrict, the express terms and provisions of this Agreement. 
17. Modifications and Amendments. The terms and provisions of this 
Agreement may be modified or amended only by a written agreement executed by all 
Parties. 
18. Waivers and Consents. Any term or provision of this Agreement may be 
waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted, only by a written document 
executed by the party entitled to the benefit of such term or provision. No such waiver 
or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute a waiver or consent with respect to 
any other term or provision of this Agreement. Each such waiver or consent shall be 
effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose for which it was given, and 
shall not constitute a continuing waiver or consent. 
19. Benefit. All statements, representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements in this Agreement shall be binding on the Parties and shall inure to the 
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto. 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except 
among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party 
beneficiary of this Agreement. 
20. Governing Law. This Agreement and the rights and obligations of the 
Parties hereunder shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of 
the State of Utah, without giving effect to the conflict of law principles thereof. 
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21. Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to adjudicate 
any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, or 
the breach, termination or validity hereof. 
22. Headings and Captions. The headings and captions of the various 
subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall in no 
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions 
hereof. 
23. No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a 
party hereto in _exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no 
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such 
right, power or remedy of the party. No single or partial exercise of any right, power or 
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or 
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude 
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, 
power or remedy hereunder. The election of any remedy by a party hereto shall not 
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No 
notice to or demand on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall 
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or 
demand in similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party 
giving such notice or demand to any other or further action in any circumstances 
without such notice or demand. 
24. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more 
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shall be deemed an orlglnal, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same 
instrument. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed this Agreement as of the dat~ 
first above written, 
100191.!IT.l,DOC: / ll 
The Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust 
Deleon Corporation Prom Sharing Plan 






Name: Sh vh, 
Title: !ft.(~ tc ~ 
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shnlr I)~ tloo:nmd a.n orlg{nat: DUI .nii or:whrcl1 loijfiil)!!f ~h~fa 001$li_iu~ Oo.~ 41\d thl) sii~,e 
in~nJflte.nt. 
IN V.'r'tNESS WHEREOF, loo Partlc,11- hav~ !i~nud this Agr~ornont-'ixa Q(\ha-dallf 
Philip(~, ·J<t!\~9. Cl\l\p.l&C ::r •iru!:l&e cf the 
t:8io,lll ~Markt. 8i.no163bactt; 
By: ""~·'"""· .,.,. .  -------Namo: 
lille; 
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. ~Oavi~ i.:··Johni~n'; uidivigu.i\ly. 
~orrett ?Sf> 
qy: ., _________ _ 
Namo; 
T"itlc~ 
\~~ PftiC~$$!!ll)HI Htirt1eU't.f)p 
1"y T.hOnH1~. lr1t!fvi6ualry 
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Uintah lnve;,trn~nts,. LLC 





By: _ _:..._,:...____:....._ _______ t---~-
Name: 
Title: 




t y Thpm~s-, irrdiyiduaiiy 
D.R.P. Management' P-S·P-
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Ty Thomas, Individually 
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David D. Smith, individually 









Ty Thomas, individually 
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. David D. Smith, individually 
Steven Condie, individually 
David L. Johnson, Individually 
Ty Thomas, Individually 
D.R.P. Management PSP 
By.-----------Name: 
Tftle: 
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This Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement'1) is made as of Mayu. 2014, by 
and among Philip G. Jones (the 'Trustee"), in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the "Debtor'), and Lexon Surety Group, LLC, 
Bond Safeguard Insurance Company, and Lexon Insurance Company (collectively, the 
"Lexon Parties"). 
BACKGROUND 
Whereas, on September 13, 2013 1 the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code11) in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Court"), commencing case 
number 13-30552 (the 11Case"); 
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 131 2014, the Case was 
converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was 
appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the 11Estate'l 
Whereas, Lexon has filed Claim No. 15-1 in the Case, asserting an unsecured 
claim in the amount of $2,097,194.10 (the "Lexon Proof of Claim"); 
Whereas. the Trustee disputes aspects of the Lexpn Proof of Claim, and in 
particular aspects of the Lexon Proof of Claim are contingent upon future events, and 
hence portions of the Lexon Proof of Claim may be subject to objection under 
Bankruptcy Code § 502(e). 
Whereas, mutually desiring to avoid the burdens, risks and expenses of potential 
litigation between themselves, the Parties have entered into this Agreement to facilitate 
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and 
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Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and ~reditors that 
will be received as a result of the settlement of these matters, particularly in light of the 
costs, uncertainties and risks of further litigation, and has concluded that the settlement 
contained herein is (i) fair and equitable, (ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties' 
disputes, (iii) in the best interests of the the Estate and its creditors. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal 
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound hereby, 
the Parties agree as follows: 
1. Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Lexon Proof of Claim. The Parties 
agree that the Lexon Proof of Claim shall be allowed in a reduced amount which is the 
greater of (a) $350,000, or (b) the sum of all allowed claims against the Estate (other 
than the subordinated claim of the Hardy Parties) multiplied by 85%, up to a maximum 
amount of $930,000 (the "Allowed Claim"). The Lexon Proof of Claim shall be 
disallowed to the extent it exceeds the Allowed Claim. In the event of (i) either (a) a 
judicial determination that the Debtor and the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan (the 11PSP")] are alter egos; or (b) the substantive consolidation of the PSP 
with the Debtor, and (ii) Stone River Falls or any of its affiliates or principals re-files a 
proof of claim, then the remainder of the Lexon Proof of Claim shall not be disallowed, 
subject to further objection by the Trustee. 
2. Release by Trustee. On the Effective Date, the Trustee, for himself and 
on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate (the "Debtor Releasors"}, shall be deemed to 
have fully, finally and forever released and discharged the Lexon Parties (and their 
respective officers, directors, shareholders, attorneys, agents, successors, and assigns) 
of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, causes of action, 
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suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands, 
accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities, damages, 
judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and indemnity, 
losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or 
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent, 
matured or unmatured, which any of the Debtor Releasers at anytime had, owned or 
held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement against any of 
the Lexon Parties by reason of any matter, cause, fact, thing, act or omission 
whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or event whatsoever, 
past or present (except for any obligations arising under this Agreement) (all of the 
foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Debtor Claims"). On and after 
the Effective Date, the Trustee hereby irrevocably waives the right to commence, 
institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the Lexon Parties 
relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Claims or the Case. 
3. Release By Lexon Parties. On the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties shall 
be deemed to have fully, finally and forever released and discharged the Trustee and 
the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the 11 Lexon 
Releasees") of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, causes 
of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues, 
demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities, 
damages, judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and 
indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, 
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or 
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owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement 
against any of the Lexon Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, fact, thing, act or 
omission whatsoever (except for any obligations arising under this Agreement and the 
Allowed Claim) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Lexon 
Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties hereby waive the right to 
commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the 
Lexon Releasees relating to, arising from or in connection with the Lexon Claims or the 
Case. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Lexon Parties 
may pursue any affiliate or party related to the Debtor (such as MLR Enterprises. LC.) 
and any property of any such entity to satisfy the outstanding obligations owed to the 
Lexon Parties. Moreover, the Trustee stipulates that the bankruptcy automatic stay 
does not preclude the Lexon Parties from pursuing claims against non-debtor entities as 
described in the preceding sentence, and the Trustee will stipulate to relief from the 
automatic stay to the extent necessary to permit the Lexon Parties to pursue claims 
against non-debtor entities. 
4. No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not 
assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in, or conveyed the 
Debtor Claims to any person or entity. (b) The Lexon Parties represent and warrant 
that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in. or 
conveyed the Lexon Claims to any person or entity. The Lexon Parties further 
represent and covenant (for the benefit of all creditors in the Case) that they will not 
seek substantive consolidation of the PSP with the Debtor or assert any claim that the 
Debtor and the PS P are alter egos . 
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5. Bankruptcy Court Approval, the Hardy Parties Settlement, and Occurrence 
of the Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledged and agree that this Agreement 
is subject to the approval of the Court. To the extent that the Court does not approve 
the Agreement and also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Hardy 
Parties and the Trustee (the "Hardy Parties Settlement Agreem_ent") on or before July 
15, 2014, or if the Effective Date does not occur on or before September 30, 2014, the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all 
of their respective rights and claims, and nothing contained herein shall be deemed a 
waiver of any and all rights and remedies of the Parties nor an acknowledgement by 
any of the Parties as to the respective rights and claims as provided for herein or 
otherwise. 
6. Effective Date. As used in this Agreement. the 11Effective Date" shall have 
the meaning ascribed that term in the Hardy Parties Settlement Agreement. 
7. Assignment of Certain Claims. On the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties 
shall assign and transfer to the Trustee, without representation or warranty of any kind, 
all causes of action asserted in Lexon Surety Group, LLC, et al. v. Brenda Rindlesbach, 
Case No.130907362, pending in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
excepting the Third, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action, which the Lexon Parties shall 
retain in their entirety. and excepting the Eighth Cause of Action insofar as it relates to 
Property No. 14 (land in West Valley City titled in the name of MLR Enterprises, LC.). 
8. Subject to Fed. R. Evid. 408. The Parties agree that this Agreement is 
entered into pursuant to, and entitled to the pro~ections of, Rule 408 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
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9. No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree that neither the acceptance 
of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be 
construed as an admission of liability or fault by any of the Parties. 
1 o. Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and 
understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes all prior oral or written agreements and understandings relating to the 
subject matter hereof. No statement, representation, warranty, covenant or agreement 
of any kind not expressly set forth in this Agreement shall affect, or be used to interpret, 
change or restrict, the express terms and provisions ·ot this Agreement. 
11. Modifications and Amendments. Except as set forth in paragraph 17 
below, the terms and provisions of this Agreement may be modified or amended only 
by a written agreement executed by all Parties. 
12. Waivers and Consents. The terms and provisions of this Agreement may 
be waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted, only by a written document 
executed by the party entitled to the benefits of such terms or provisions. No such 
waiver or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute a waiver or consent with 
respect to any other terms or provisions of this Agreement. Each such waiver or 
consent shall be effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose for which it 
was given1 and shall not constitute a continuing waiver or consent. 
13. Benefit. All statements1 representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements in this Agreement shall be binding on the Parties and shall inure to the 
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto. 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except 
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among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party 
beneficiary of this Agreement. 
14. Governing Law. This Agreement and the rights and obligations of the 
Parties hereunder shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of 
the State of Utah, without giving effect to the conflict of law principles thereof. 
15. Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to 
adjudicate any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this 
Agreement, or the breach, termination or validity hereof. 
16. Headings and Captions. The heading~ and captions of the various 
subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall in no 
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions 
hereof. · 
17. No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a 
party hereto in exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no 
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such 
right, power or remedy of the party. No single or partial exercise of any right, power or 
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or 
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude 
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, 
power or remedy hereunder. The election of any remedy by a party hereto shall not 
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No 
notice to or demand on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall 
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or 
demand in similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party 
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giving such notlc~ or demand to any other or further action In any circumstances 
without such notice or demand. 
18. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed In one or more 
counterparts, and by different Parties hereto on separate counterparts. each of which 
shall be deemed an original. but all of which together shall constitute one and the same 
instrument. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the Parties have signed this Agreement as of 
the date first above written. 
(0019147 I.DOC/} 
Lexon Surety Group, LLC 
By: ~-~. 
Name: Michael Belinski 
Title: Collections Attorney 
Bond Safeguard Insurance Company 
By: IJ14Juj~. 
Name: Michael Belinski 
Title: Collect1ons Attorney 
Lexon Insurance Company . 
By: ~~Jl. 
8 
Name: Michael Bell'nski 
Title: Collections Attorney 
